Derek Haderlie
Over the past fifteen years, there has been growing interest in what are known as thick evaluative concepts. Thick concepts like Generous, Brutal, Cruel, and Kind are often contrasted with thin concepts like Good, Bad, Right, Wrong. What is interesting is how little attention has been given to thick properties and facts, in contrast to thick concepts. In fact, I only know of two papers that directly address the distinction between thick and thin properties. In his 2019 paper, Justin Morton argues that we should understand the distinction between thick and thin properties in ground-theoretic terms. He claims that normative principles play an important role in distinguishing between thick and thin properties.
In my paper I will argue, contra Morton (2019) that we should understand the notion of thick properties in essence-theoretic rather than in ground-theoretic terms. I first raise several puzzles for Morton’s ground-theoretic proposal. I then offer my essence-theoretic proposal. On the account I offer, we can distinguish thick from thin properties by whether they essentially involve non-normative elements: thick properties do, while thin properties do not. I then consider the upshots of such a view for one of the central debates in metaethics: the debate between non-naturalist realists and naturalist realists.